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OECD Transfer Pricing Methods | GTP GlobalTransferPricing

Hierarchical Selection of Arm’s Length Test Models on Transfer Pricing between Related Parties
Transfer pricing between related parties requires the arm’s length test. Default test models have been developed over the course of almost half a century and proposed by the OECD in its various issues of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. Being a tax jurisdiction, the addressee of the OECD recommendations on how to test for the arm’s length character of transfer prices primarily is the national tax jurisdiction which can opt to integrate such OECD output in domestic tax code, regulations, or administrative principles. Of course, courts may also rule on the applicability of such test models.

This handout describes the GTP Concept on the application of the OECD Transfer Pricing Methods

1 Legal Provision
As is the case for business transactions between third parties, transfer pricing between related parties within the multinational group is underlying a given legal framework. The legal provisions subject to a particular related-party transaction may vary across business models, industries, countries, and times. Yet, some basic structures on the legal framework can be referred to.
1.1 Law of Obligations
First, the Law of Obligations is pivotal to set, and assess, transfer prices. The underlying understanding is that the contractual arrangement framing the related-party transaction enjoys the principle of freedom of contract. Contractual features such as
▪ the choice of the related-party transaction partners,
▪ the definition of the type of exchange on products, services, rights, or guarantee,
▪ the allocation of function, risk, and assets,
▪ the model of price setting, invoicing, and updating over the contractual terms,
▪ the application of force majeure rights and the place of jurisdiction, and other features,

are subject to the Law of Obligations of the respective jurisdictions involved. In most transfer pricing cases, such a law of obligation does not stipulate the way transfer prices need to be calculated, nor does this law rule on the allocation of cost or profit. In particular, in almost all countries around the globe, the Law of Obligations does not bind the decision-makers on the amount, or the ratio, of a profit element assigned to either transaction partner involved. Any definition of transfer pricing methods for price-setting or the arm’s length test is not provided.

1.2 Commercial Code
Second, the Commerical Code of the countries involved does neither specify the calculation model, the amount charged, any expense accounted for, nor does it rule on the profit amount and the profit ratio included in the given related-party transaction. Consequently, the Commercial Code of most jurisdictions – through binding to corporate companies – is of little help to analyze the arm’s length character of a transfer price or the transfer pricing model of the multinational group. Likewise importantly from the perspective of the commercial code of countries involved, transfer pricing allows broad decision-making freedom on the size of the transaction volume and the allocation of costs and profits to the related parties involved. Again, any definition of transfer pricing methods, be it for price-setting or for the arm’s length test, is not provided for in constitutional states.

1.3 Corporate Law
Third, another area of legal provisions to be reflected in the Corporate Law of the country in which the related party is resident or elsewhere bound to by its business model and the presence of business activities. Also, this body of the legal framework of performing related-party business within multinational firms does not provide explicit guidance on the arm’s length nature of transfer pricing. To some extent, transactions among shareholders or transactions between shareholders and the incorporated entities of the multinational group are determined by such law, referring to the concepts of constructive dividends (hidden profit distribution) and constructive equity contribution. Shareholder issues and shareholder accounts could be of relevance regarding the stewardship costs and accruals for the benefit of the shareholder. However, in this area of legal provisions, any definition of transfer pricing methods can hardly be found.

1.4 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines
Fourth, the international tax law of jurisdictions involved in the transfer pricing fact pattern is obviously the legal arena where particular transfer pricing provisions can be found. Here, the OECD has issued its OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines on transfer pricing methods. The OECD is constituted as an international institution providing for substantial input to harmonize the international tax regime of member states and non-member affiliates. From this perspective follows that the purpose of the OECD guidance on the transfer pricing methods – in contrast to any other kind of testing the arm’s length character of transfer prices – is thought to reduce the risk of double taxation, or non-taxation, by providing for a harmonized approach of delineating the fact pattern. In particular, guidance on transfer pricing methods is applicable for the following procedural steps:
▪ Transfer pricing documentation and cooperation in local/domestic tax audits (either in countries of self-assessment procedures, e.g. USA, or official investigation procedures, e.g. Germany);
▪ during the MAP processes (MAP; Mutual Agreement Procedures) between tax jurisdictions involved in the particular controversy procedure of the transfer pricing fact pattern, and subject to respective Double Tax Treaty (DTT) existent; and
▪ Advance pricing agreements.
The template of such DTTs, worldwide, is the OECD Model Tax Convention.

The OECD guidance on transfer pricing methods is defined in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines to somehow generate a level of harmonization from both/all tax jurisdictions on the fact pattern involving two or more countries and their tax administrations.

Of course, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, together with the United Nations Transfer Pricing Manual, can be applied by non-members of the OECD circle as well. Also, the taxpayer is invited by such guidance to deploy the concepts for arguing on the arm’s length character of transfer pricing – be it at the time of the decisions on price setting (comp. OECD BEPS Action Plan 8-10) or for documentation purposes (comp. OECD BEPS Action Plan 13)

2 The Transfer Pricing Method
The purpose of the transfer pricing methods, as defined by the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (latest version: 2017) is the application of a coordinated analysis model on the given transfer pricing fact pattern. In theory, each test model (=OECD Transfer Pricing Method) would arrive in the same analysis result, i.e., as to whether the transfer price is/was at arm’s length or not. In practice, however, such various test models exist, as different types of fact patterns require specific items of the transfer pricing case with corresponding information on the side of the third parties. While the information on specific related-party fact patterns may exist within the multinational group, the corresponding third-party information to reason on the “comparability” is often not available. This is one of the reasons for the fact that in practice the TNMM model is the most often used arm’s length transfer pricing method worldwide. The other main reason has to do with the business model of the transfer pricing consulting industry which, driven by business reasons, favors the application “benchmarking” which often is a highly profitable component of transfer pricing projects.

The following table provides an overview of the test models on transfer pricing.

AbbreviationOECD MethodMethod TypeObject of AnalysisIndicator (price, profit level, other)Type of third-party informationDefault applicability in transfer pricing systemsRelative importance in practice
1 (low) till 5 (high)
CUPComparable Uncontrolled Price MethodStandard, Transactional profitAmount of transfer priceEuro, Dollar, Rupee, Won, etc. (currency)Unit prices are subject to the number of units soldIf the number of units, qualities, and terms & conditions is comparable2
C+Cost Plus MethodStandard, Transactional profitA markup ratio of transfer pricing volume at the providerNet Profit Markup (%) on Full Costs, or
Gross Profit Markup (%) on Costs of Function
Markups of individual transactions between third partiesWhere the provider of the transaction is routine regarding risk and assets;
Default markup ratios available in practice
4
R-Resale Minus MethodStandard, Transactional profitGross margin ratio of transfer pricing volume at the recipientGross Margin (%) of Sales VolumeMarkups of individual transactions between third partiesFor reselling functions1
TNMMTransactional Net Margin MethodTransactional, ApproximationOperating Margin of transfer pricing volume (usually of the recipient)Operating Margin (%) of Sales Volume of FunctionEBIT% margins of third partiesThe standard approach in more than 90 percent of transfer pricing studies; applicable to a functional approach of the analysis performed;
In the continental European context and other OECD countries
5
RPSResidual Profit Split MethodNew
Profit method; Transactional or on an entity level
Routine profitability (usually operating margin) plus excess profitability (or loss), both/all transaction partners involved in the value chainMarkups or Operating Margins (%) on “routine functions” plus additional operating profitability related to non-routine functionsEBIT% margins of third partiesIn cases where both/all related parties involved are assessed as non-routine units2
CPMComparable Profit MethodEntityProfitability of related-party entity, involved in the transfer pricing systemEBIT%EBIT% margins of third partiesApplied to the entity level of analysis; most often applied as TNMM approach.
In the anglo-American context.
5

3 Most Appropriate Method – The GTP Position
Some jurisdictions require the taxpayer to elaborate on the “most appropriate method” for the arm’s length test. Subsequently, a given order of applicability is herewith proposed:
▪ The test making use of the CUP is considered to be the most appropriate one if price comparables are available subject to the conditions of quantities, qualities, and terms & conditions on the transaction exchanged. In most cases, such specifics on the third-party side of the arm’s length test are not available in sufficient detail. Also, in practice many tax jurisdictions do not accept the arm’s length test using only CUP as this model does not tell them much about the profit allocated by this transaction in the jurisdictions involved. The method only measures monetary values, i.e. prices per unit or per project.
▪ The C+ test is most applicable for product and service transactions when the transaction provider performs a limited set of functions for this transaction, bears little risk, and deploys only routine assets. The profit level indicator deployed in this test is the net markup or gross markup on a given transaction. Comparables need to be transaction-specific which, in most cases, is not possible to find for individual transactions. Using information from published financial statements of comparable companies is rarely transaction-specific, as such statements on “transaction-specific profits” cannot be drawn from financial figures of the financial statements of a particular comparable unit. If the analyst uses such published financial statements, the method actually is deemed to be a kind of net transactional margin model in a similar manner to TNMM (i.e. Transactional Markup Model).
▪ The R- test suits best to test the gross margin of reselling functions. However, in audit practice, the model rarely appears sufficient to the tax authorities as the gross margin does not say much about the arm’s length character of the basis for corporate income tax rates applicable, i.e. the net profit or net profitability. Also, transaction-based comparables are not often available in practice. Nevertheless, if R- is confronted with gross margins from published financial statements, the model becomes a kind of gross transaction margin model.
▪ The RPS test model is more complex to apply. It is conceived for situations in which more than one transaction partner is non-routine. The arm’s length reference can be the interquartile statistics of the benchmarking approach. This model enjoys an increasing relevance in transfer pricing practices.
▪ The TNMM model tests the operating margin (profitability) of the function considered. The function is either the recipient (usually the sales/reselling function) or the provider of the related-party transaction (usually the contract manufacturer or service provider). If the tested party only performs this single function OR if that entity only performs related-party transactions with only one other related party, the EBIT% margin of the tested party is usually used, and sufficient, as a profit level indicator. Consequently, in such a specific situation, the TNMM approach is actually turned into the CPM model as applied in many Anglo-American jurisdictions.

As a result, most often the TNMM approach is deployed as a method of last resort as it is the only method to confront transaction-related data of the multinational group with arm’s length data available. In more than 90 percent of the transfer pricing documentation, the TNMM / CPM approach is the key part of the arm’s length test.

Another reason for the prominence of the TNMM / CPM approach can be found in the sales proposition of consulting teams pretending the benchmarking study is a “must” for the arm’s length tests within the transfer pricing documentation. Of course, many tax jurisdictions also rule that the “benchmark study” must be provided within the documentation package. In addition, the TNMM / CPM approach is easy to perform since the related party’s total profitability (EBIT%) can be deployed as a proxy for testing with the EBIT%-profitabilities of comparables which anyway are legal-entity profit margins derived from published financial statements.

The GTP® TEAM applies the other test models if individual transactions are observed at the tested party. For more information, see legal provisions.

Die OECD BEPS Rahmenbedingungen: Base Erosion and Profit Split

Dieser Text stellt mit einigen Ergänzungen das Kapitel 3 der Buchpublikation des Autors dar: „Die dritte Dekade – Verrechnungspreise & Gewinnabgrenzung im 21. Jahrhundert“ (ISBN 978-3-9822728-1-8), erschienen im Verlag Markus Brem Group. Das Buch ist Teil der Schriftenreihe „Gesellschaft im Wandel“. Dieser Textbaustein gibt eine Übersicht zum OECD BEPS Projekt mit Bezug auf Verrechnungspreise.

1 Neustrukturierung des Internationalen Steuerrechts
Ein wesentlicher Auslöser der teils realisierten, teils noch anstehenden Anpassungen von gewinnsteuerlichen Vorschriften mit Bezug auf Verrechnungspreissysteme stellen die Rahmenbedingungen aus dem G20 / OECD BEPS Projekt dar. BEPS steht für Base Erosion and Profit Shifting. Mit diesem Projekt möchte ein großer Teil der Staatengemeinschaft einen Riegel vorschieben gegen das Erodieren von steuerlichen Bemessungsgrundlagen für die Gewinnbesteuerung sowie das Verlagern von Gewinnen. Neben den OECD Mitgliedsstaaten haben sich viele weitere Staaten – derzeit sind es 139 – den Grundüberlegungen und dem seitens der OECD vorgeschlagenen Modell des Inclusive Frameworks angeschlossen. Dabei geht es um viel: 240 Mrd. US-Dollar verlieren die Steuerstaaten laut OECD aufgrund der Steuervermeidung von Unternehmen.
Ausführliche, gut strukturierte Informationen stellt die OECD für den Praktiker auf ihrer Internetseite bereit:
http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/beps-actions/
Insgesamt 15 BEPS Aktionspläne (BEPS Action Plan) wurden in einem mehrjährigen Prozess in den entsprechenden Working Parties unter Einbezug der Mitgliedsstaaten, assoziierter Staaten, wissenschaftlicher Einrichtungen, der Beratungsindustrie sowie anderer Experten definiert. Diese wurde seit Herbst 2015 mit dem Final Report vorgestellt (OECD 2015 Final Report, 05.10.2015) und weiter präzisiert. Nachfolgend finden sich die Einzelpläne aufgelistet.

Tabelle 1: G20/OECD BEPS Action Plans
A

Nr.NameEnglishDeutsch
Action 1Tax Challenges Arising from DigitalisationChallenges for the taxation of the digital economyHerausforderungen für die Besteuerung der digitalen Wirtschaft
Action 2Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch ArrangementsNeutralising the effects of hybrid mismatch arrangementsNeutralisierung der Effekte hybrider Gestaltungen
Action 3Controlled Foreign CompanyStrengthening of the rules on additional taxation (so-called CFC rules)Stärkung der Vorschriften zur Hinzurechnungsbesteuerung (sog. CFC-Regeln)
Action 4Limitation on Interest DeductionsLimitation of profit reduction by deducting interest or other financial expensesBegrenzung der Gewinnverkürzung durch Abzug von Zins- oder sonstigen finanziellen Aufwendungen
Action 5Harmful Tax PracticesCombating harmful tax practices more effectively, considering transparency and substanceWirksamere Bekämpfung schädlicher Steuerpraktiken unter Berücksichtigung von Transparenz und Substanz
Action 6Prevention of Tax Treaty AbusePrevention of tax treaty abuseVerhinderung von Abkommensmissbrauch
Action 7Permanent Establishment StatusPreventing the artificial avoidance of permanent establishment statusVerhinderung der künstlichen Umgehung des Status als Betriebsstätte
Action 8-10Transfer PricingEnsuring the correspondence between transfer pricing results and value creationGewährleistung der Übereinstimmung zwischen Verrechnungspreisergebnissen und Wertschöpfung
Action 11BEPS Data AnalysisMeasurement and monitoring of profit reduction and profit shiftingMessung und Monitoring von Gewinnverkürzung und Gewinnverlagerung
Action 12Mandatory Disclosure RulesObligation of taxpayers to disclose their aggressive tax planning modelsVerpflichtung der Steuerpflichtigen zur Offenlegung ihrer aggressiven Steuerplanungsmodelle
Action 13Country-by-Country ReportingRevision of the transfer pricing documentationÜberarbeitung der Verrechnungspreisdokumentationen
Action 14Mutual Agreement ProcedureImproving the effectiveness of dispute settlement mechanismsVerbesserung der Wirksamkeit von Streitbeilegungsmechanismen
Action 15Multilateral InstrumentDevelopment of a multilateral instrumentEntwicklung eines multilateralen Instruments

Quelle: GTP / eigene Zusammenstellung aus http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/beps-actions/.

Die OECD kann zwar mit diesen Aktionsplänen und den einzelnen Dokumenten lediglich eine Empfehlung an die OECD Mitgliedsstaaten aussprechen – im Unterschied zur Europäischen Union, bei der die EU Directives (EU Richtlinie) verpflichtend für die nationale Umsetzung auf Ebene der Mitgliedsstaaten ist. Aber dennoch wirken die Guidelines wesentlich auf die Nationalstaaten und die Akteure des Internationalen Steuerrechts.

Auch das OECD Musterabkommen zu Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen (OECD Model Tax Treaty) oder die OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines haben nur Empfehlungscharakter und keine rechtsverbindliche Wirkung. Im Übrigen können die nationalen Finanzbehörden mit ihren Verwaltungsgrundsätzen auf die OECD Dokumente Bezug nehmen und sogar als maßgeblich definieren wie dies beispielsweise mit dem BMF-Schreiben IV B 5 – S 1341/0 :003 v. 05.07.2018 (Umlageverträge) stattfand. Mit diesem Schreiben legt das BMF fest, dass nicht mehr das eigene BMF-Schreiben zu Umlageverträge aus dem Jahr 1999 maßgeblich bei der Prüfung von Umlageverträgen sein soll, sondern die Grundsätze des Kapitels VIII der OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 2017.

2 BEPS Action Pläne und Regelwerke in Deutschland
Auf dem Gebiet der Verrechnungspreise sind es nun insbesondere die Aktionspläne 13 „Dokumentation“ und 8-10 „Transfer Pricing“, die der Praktiker im Blick haben sollte.
Für den Steuerstaat Bundesrepublik Deutschland finden sich die wichtigsten Rechtsvorschriften auf dem Gebiet des Transfer Pricing in folgenden Gesetzen und Rechtsverordnungen (Vorschriften zu Finanzgerichtsverfahren sind hier nicht genannt):

Tabelle 2: Gesetze und Verordnungen in Deutschland zu Verrechnungspreisen

KurzformNameGesetz / VerordnungLetzte Änderung
AOAbgabenordnungGesetz12.08.2020
AbzStEntModGAbzugssteuerentlastungs
modernisierungsgesetz
Gesetz08.06.2021
AStGAußensteuergesetzGesetz25.03.2019
ATADUmsGAnti Tax Avoidance Directive
Umsetzungsgesetz
Gesetz (Entwürfe)04.06.2021
BGBBürgerliches Gesetzbuch Gesetz 16.10.2020
BsGaVBetriebsstättengewinn
aufteilungsverordnung
Verordnung13.10.2014
EStGEinkommensteuergesetz Gesetz 12.08.2020
FVerlVFunktionsverlagerungs
verordnung
Verordnung26.06.2013
GAufzV 2003Gewinnabgrenzungs
aufzeichnungs-Verordnung
Verordnung13.11.2003
GAufzV 2017Gewinnabgrenzungs
aufzeichnungs-Verordnung
Verordnung20.12.2016
KStGKörperschaftsteuergesetz Gesetz 21.12.2019

Quelle: GTP / eigene Zusammenstellung aus www.gesetze-im-internet.de Seiten des Bundesamts für Justiz.

Wichtige gesetzliche Regelung sind in den letzten Wochen in Deutschland vom Bundestag in der noch laufenden Legislaturperiode verabschiedet worden, insbesondere das ATADUmsG und das AbzStEntModG. Entsprechende Rechtsverordnungen werden zeitnah folgen genauso wie die begleitenden Verwaltungsgrundsätze bzw. die BMF-Schreiben und natürlich im Gefolge später Gerichtsurteile zu einschlägigen Streitfällen.

3 BEPS & Praxis
Die BEPS-Rahmenbedingungen haben sicherlich ein Umdenken in der Verrechnungspreispraxis ausgelöst: nicht nur im Großkonzern, sondern auch in mittelständisch geführten kleinen Unternehmensgruppen bekommt der Bereich der „Verrechnungspreise“ einen besonderen Stellenwert. Ein laxer Umgang oder eine fehlende Beschäftigung mit Verrechnungspreisen genügt eindeutig nicht mehr für die betroffenen Steuerpflichtigen, aber auch für Berater.

Eine unzureichende Beachtung der steuerlichen Aspekte von Verrechnungspreissystemen fällt den Entscheidungsträgern schon heute auf auf die Füße, wenn es zur steuerlichen Betriebsprüfung kommt, insbesondere wenn im Ausland hohe, zweitstellige Gewinnraten bei den dortigen nahestehenden Personen beobachtbar sind. Dies wird in den kommenden Jahren an Bedeutung zunehmen.

Insbesondere solche steuerlichen Berater, die nur wenige Mandanten mit Verrechnungspreisfällen haben, sollten versuchen die Sachverhalte beim Mandanten zu erkennen und einer Relevanzprüfung zuzuführen.

Transfer Pricing Analysis on Related-Party Transactions and Income Allocation of Multinational Groups

1. Introduction
The term Transfer Pricing Analysis refers to several features of the arm’s length assessment of transfer pricing between, and income allocation of related parties. With regard to corporate business structures, the related parties form a large international business organization which is usually called Multinational Group. For the purpose of this paper, and in accordance to the GTP® Model of the Arm’s Length Analysis, the term Transfer Pricing Analysis shall be delineated along the steps described hereinafter.

2. Three Dimensions of the Term Transfer Pricing
For illustrative purposes, the term transfer pricing shall be positioned in the context of the tax-compliance requirement of Transfer Pricing Analysis. The term Transfer Pricing is presented with following default graph in normalized form. The graph presents the three dimensions of the term “Transfer Pricing”, referring to (a) the business transaction, (b) the OECD Model on testing the arm’s length character, and (c) the required arm’s length information. The graph exemplifies the CUP model, though this paper does not address specific OECD Transfer Pricing Methods while they will be covered in a different output.

Graph: The Threefold Perspective on the Term Transfer Pricing and Transfer Pricing Analysis
Source: GTP® GlobalTransferPricing Business Solutions GmbH.

On the left side, the graph presents the business perspective on transfer pricing, i.e. the relationship between the two related parties A and B which are involved in a business transaction under the law of obligations. A is the provider of the good, service, user right, or guarantee (for purpose of abbreviation, hereinafter called “transactional good”) and B is the recipient. According to the Law of Obligations, under the contract agreed between A and B, A is obliged to deliver the transactional good and is also requested by the contract to accept the reward (i.e. accept the transfer price) on such delivery, while B’s obligation is to receive the delivery and to provide for the reward (i.e. pay the transfer price). The transfer price is referred to 70, and B’s output to third parties is 100. The default picture does not yet determine the nature of the figures of 70 and 100 (monetary quantity per unit, sum of transactional volume in a given period, relative figure of the value chain, and the like).

In the middle part, the tax-world testing model is assigned using default test approach as defined by the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. Such test models are the OECD Transfer Pricing Methods and the graph presents the example of the Comparable Uncontrolled Price method (CUP). As known, other methods are Resale Minus, Cost Plus, Transactional Net Margins, Residual Profit Split, Profit Split, Comparable Profit. Each of these methods reflect certain fact pattern caused by the business transaction (e.g. function and risk pattern) and the kind of arm’s length information available for this test.

The arm’s length information is presented on the right part of the graph, here the example of a sample of price comparable presented as interquartile statistics. This implies that the line (level) of the transfer price as a monetary value is directly compared with “comparable prices”. Such test is rather rare, while the large bulk of arm’s length tests are based on profitability ratios and so-called “benchmarking”. Benchmarking is the prominent term implemented by the consulting industry for this part of dealing with transfer pricing and the arm’s length analysis, and in most cases of benchmarking the arm’s length information refers to profitability indicators, also called profit level indicators (PLI), derived from published financial statements of companies which are identified as “comparable”. It should be noted that the choice of the OECD Transfer Pricing Method, from a theoretical point of view, has a direct impact on the usage of the kind of the arm’s length information and the comparable therein. However, from a tax-law perspective, such direct relationship is not established in the tax code, nor in regulations, and most often even not in administrative principles. Also, the OECD Model Tax Treaty or the OECD Transfer Pricing Guideline do not rule for a specific relationship between the Method and the Indicator. An overview is given by the OECD’s Transfer Pricing Country Profiles. This is part of different paper, too.

  1. Transfer Pricing Analysis
    We now turn back to the term “Transfer Pricing Analysis” and how it can be managed in practitioner cases.

3.1 Organization of the multinational group
First, for transfer pricing practice, the analyst will have to elaborate on the identification of the business model of the related parties which are involved in the exchange of transactional goods. The identification of the related-party structure and the organizational scope of the multinational group is material to the transfer pricing analysis, as a certain portion of related-party organizations do not exchange transactional goods at all. Other multinational groups might have such exchanges, yet with a clear emphasis on domestic business models. In such case, the group of related parties might be international, but the business model itself is domestic. A large part of globalization, however, is related to cross-border business transactions within the respective multinational group, i.e. between related parties which are resident, and located, in different tax jurisdictions.

3.2 Business transaction
The next steps is the definition of the business transaction between two or more related parties. In case of an exchange between a headquarter and its permanent establishment, this “transaction” is called dealings. In the course of defining the business transactions, the transfer pricing analyst will have to identify whether other business exchanges take place which, for the purpose of the arm’s length test of the business transaction under scrutiny, need to be understood and evaluated, too. For example, such interrelatedness of transactions is given with regard to the usage of trademarks and tradenames which are not being charged as separated transaction but integral to the transaction under scrutiny. Also, certain management services and shared services could be exchanged between related parties without having to be paid for, as they are interrelated, and integral to, other the transaction under scutiny. In such case, the transaction under scrutiny might be aligned with such additional exchanges, not having to be charged so far in a separate transaction.

3.3 Function and Risk Analysis
Then, the identification of functions performed, risk borne, and assets deployed for performing this business transaction; this requires a general picture both on the functions, risk, and assets on the level of the multinational group and its related parties (so-called “Group-Level Function and Risk Analysis”) and the in-depth analysis of functions, risk, assets which relate to this specific business transaction between two or more related parties of that same group (so-called “Transaction-specific Function and Risk Analysis”). That latter one results in the choice of the OECD Transfer Pricing Method.

The transaction-specific function and risk analysis serves as a kind of anchorage of this related party which is deemed the routine unit, while the other party, in such dichotomous situation, is treated as the residual claimant (entrepreneur). In practice, of course, this is a usually continuous variable rather than a discrete choice between two alternatives and from the perspective of tax provisions, no definition is given in local tax provisions and/or OECD text bodies (e.g. OECD Transfer Pricing Guideline) what features exactly determine routine vs. entrepreneur and to what extent the one or the other label should be assigned to the transactional fact pattern and the related parties involved. In most practitioner cases, the headquarters unit is deemed as the non-routine unit (entrepreneur = residual claimant) and the local sales unit then is called “routine”. However, with reference to “substance over form” principles in international taxation, this default position – often a kind of stereotype applied by transfer pricing practitioners – needs to be questioned as most local sales unit bear the full risk of the market, the customer relationship, and its own organization.

Following this, inherent in the Transaction-specific Function and Risk Analysis is the understanding of the Price Setting Type chosen by the transaction partners (comp. left part of the Graph above). Practically, in cases of a manufacturer-reseller model of transfer pricing, we find in three out of five cases the price setting model where budgeted direct costs are marked up with a gross profit computed with a gross markup ratio. This gross profit itself is understood to remunerate indirect costs of the center and the overall organization of this related party and, sometimes, it is understood to allocate profit. In another fifths of cases, we identify a gross margin model in which the reseller is assigned a gross margin referred to a list price information on the level of the third-party transaction to the customer (comp. the figure 100 in the graph above) and the remainder belongs to the manufacturer. The final fifths of our cases shows various other types of price setting such as arbitrarily prices, residual profit split models (adjustments prior to the year’s end), or target pricing with the intention of fixing the profitability of either of the related party involved. Of course, practical cases may also reveal loss situations, excess profitability, and all kind of adjustments and non-adjustments in the transfer pricing system. Some multinational groups have even defined the transfer pricing volume along a kind of formulary apportionment (e.g. sales volume with customers across sales entities).

The larger part of the transaction volume invoiced between related parties is not grounded by a specific framework contract (e.g. Supplier-Reseller-Agreement), but the general terms and conditions document of the entities involved and the respective order-invoice documents deployed for accounting purposes. As the Law of Obligation in most jurisdictions and for most transaction types does not request specific written contract documents while permitting form-free, informal contracts, the lack of such framework contracts simply boomerangs back in the course of transfer pricing documentation, tax audit, and other disclosure of evidence on the nature of price setting.

3.4 OECD Transfer Pricing Method
The OECD Transfer Pricing Methods, by their nature of origin, are models to test for the arm’s length character of transfer prices (CUP, C+, R-, transactional RPS) or profit allocation (TNMM, CPM, PS; RPS). In the course of the last fifty years, they have been drafted for the sake of harmonizing double tax treaty cases which are, at first, an issue between nation states. Only in recent years, such methods were discussed as price setting models. With the exception of a few specific situations such as “fully comparability of the transaction with the arm’s length information” (comp. Art. 1 (3) Foreign Tax Act, Germany), no jurisdiction around the globe shows provisions on how transfer prices should be identified for the purpose of complying with the Law of Obligations. Likewise, the jurisdiction-specific tax law on corporate income taxation does not determine how the price for a transactional good should be found, neither in kind, nor in size. Yet, and hence, the OECD Transfer Pricing Methods are models to test such price setting for purposes of justifying the arm’s length character of prices (monetary value), transactional margins or markups (gross or net), or profit allocation (profit center level or entity level). The Formulary Apportionment, so far, is considered to be a non-recognized test model of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and this position currently is under revision in the course of introducing the Pillar I and Pillar II system of the taxing model as recently proposed by the OECD.

3.5 Arm’s Length Information
Going a step further, the transfer pricing analysis refers to the arm’s length principle which, as described elsewhere, can be deemed as an economic principle for assessing the nature of transfer pricing for tax purposes. The arm’s length principle refers to (comp. the Graph above):
• the delineation of the transaction as defined above,
• the test model (OECD Transfer Pricing Method), and
• the arm’s length information aligned to the OECD Transfer Pricing Method chosen.
A given transactional fact pattern could be established with more than one test model and the corresponding arm’s length information. The analyst may increase the robustness of the transfer pricing analysis model by implementing a multiple and/or multi-layer model (the GTP® Multilayer Model is described elsewhere).

Most arm’s length information, deployed in practical transfer pricing cases, is profitability data on third parties, i.e. profitability ratios. The source of such information is published in financial statements of companies around the world and the commercial database providing for such information (e.g. BvD Orbis). Other arm’s length information are license rates, or royalty rates, interest rates, and price comparable. Except of the price comparable which are shown as monetary values, transfer pricing practitioners deploy relative figures to show arm’s length information. Interest rates, license rates, and profitability rates are relative figures, and in most cases of arm’s length information, such figures are presented along interquartile statistics based on samples of observations.

Nowadays, arm’s length information is often deployed in a transfer pricing system as a commodity. Transfer pricing systems without arm’s length information are considered incomplete – at least for the purpose of documentation and auditing – and refusing to implement such information in the transfer pricing system can be considered risky, even silly, as it is nowadays standard, commodity, and cheap. In most tax codes, the arm’s length principle as set forth requires to arm’s length information.

Most experts sell such arm’s length information in the shape of so-called “Benchmark Studies” and, as often for international tax issues, benchmarking was initiated by BIG4 teams, starting in the 1990s in the US market, as a big money tool for transfer pricing projects. While such benchmark studies priced for US$ 100.000 and even more in the early phase of making use of them, nowadays such interquartile statistics together with the screening process may range between a few hundred Euros and a little thousands of Euros. Some experts include the fees on benchmarking in other features of transfer pricing consulting expertise so that the client does not even recognize anymore the price of the benchmark.

Using so-called “Benchmark Studies” as attachments to the documentation of the related-party taxpayer is a must in many jurisdiction even though it appears almost ridiculous with regard to the analysis value, its content, additional insight, and merits one may get from such benchmark information. Yet, over the last two decades it became infiltering the transfer pricing logic, the corresponding market of transfer pricing expertise, and, to some extent, the exclusivity of consultants separating those who can from those who can’t.

3.6 Arm’s Length Assessment
The arm’s length assessment is the “art of transfer pricing” in the meaning that, from a taxpayer’s perspective, arguments can be found for why the price setting, the transfer price or its margin, and the income allocation can be assessed as third parties would have succeeded had they undergone similar transactions in a comparable environment. It is about arguing. And from the perspective of the tax authorities involved, the art of transfer pricing could be either the position to challenge such arm’s length argument of the taxpayer or to turn a blind eye for the sake of a smooth audit process with little controversy with the taxpayer, local courts, and the other state (Contacting State) of the Double Tax Treaty. The details of the arm’s length assessment will be discussed in a separate paper.

4. Final Remarks
The Transfer Pricing Analysis should be understood as a multi-step approach to understand, and to assess, the related-party business transaction including the inherent business model of the related-parties involved.
For information, visit www.GlobalTransferPricing.com.

Complexity & Tax Cooperation in International Taxation: Transfer Pricing

Complexity and the Need for Cooperation
Reducing complexity is a key challenge in international taxation – and elsewhere in fields of globalization and sustainable governance of societies. Nowadays, reducing complexity is in the heart of international taxation: cross-border transfer pricing between related parties and associated companies of the same multinational group. At a first glance, transfer pricing appears to be overloaded with complexity. From a wider perspective, transfer pricing is about relationships within and between the corporate units of the multinational group (corporate law), the economic perspective of (transfer) pricing (law of obligations), and the international tax perspective (tax law) with its domestic tax provisions, its multiplicity in the pyramiding of double tax treaties, and the interaction with non-treaty jurisdictions.

Interestingly, since the launch of the new business model on reducing unneeded complexity in transfer pricing as it was initiated by the GTP® TEAM )GTP GlobalTransferPricing Business Solutions GmbH) in early 2018, the expert teams of the Big4 consultants (Ernst&Young, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte, and KPMG) as well as other specialists on international taxation such as WTS AG copied this line of communication. Indeed, GTP’s message is clearly defined: Standardization, Simplification, Documentation

1. Cooperation modes claimed by governments
More than ever, the constantly increasing complexity in transfer pricing matters is the reason why the Secretary General of the OECD, Angel Gurría, recently placed the discussion on “a turning point for tax: international co-operation for better regulation of globalization” (Feb. 1, 2021) in the OECD Forum.[1] The development of the last two decades or so in international tax complexity appears interesting not only from the perspective of taxation and how tax dollars can be identified and sourced by governments, but also from an academic point of view in political economy sciences by asking why cooperation should resolve problems which otherwise, i.e. with other mechanisms of governance, seem not resolvable.

This was addressed many years back by Markus Brem in his writings on Advance Pricing Agreements (APA). There, he asked the question why the constitutional state with sovereign taxing rights such as the legal code, regulations, tax authorities, courts, and the like resorts to the cooperation model in some areas of the arena of international taxation, specifically with the model of the APAs, while the default governance structure for taxation actually is bureaucracy.[2] Pointed even more specifically, bureaucratic governance is the mode for domestic taxation and most parts of international taxation, and only in the tiny arena of income taxation of related parties of multinational groups, APAs in particular, and cooperation in general, is nowadays discussed as problem-solving?

The issue can be drawn more touchable by following points:
Billions of dollars of corporate income taxes are collected by means of the ordinary and well-established procedure: the business performed by the taxpayer results in income which is filed for taxation. Such filing is reviewed by means of using the tax audit processes determined for establishing accuracy, correctness and probity of the fair tax base allocation. Tax audits are performed by the sovereign state, usually in the form of special units within the tax authorities of the jurisdiction where the taxpayer is tax-liable. If the fact pattern is cross-border, specific methods and procedures are applied such as the arm’s length principle and the OECD Transfer Pricing Methods established with third-party comparable, transfer pricing documentation, and the like.

However, a certain portion of such billions of tax dollars are allocated and assessed, by means of the procedures following the APA model. In advance, prior to the execution of the business, the parties involved in the process of taxation, i.e. the related-party taxpayer and both (or all) tax jurisdictions, do agree on critical assumptions of the related-party business model and the transfer pricing methods used on price setting and the arm’s length test. Basically, an APA represents the negotiation result between the nation states (income tax jurisdictions) and the taxpayers involved.

Again, the question arises why such sovereign states “step downwards” and do start negotiation on taxes? Markus Brem, a transfer pricing expert directing the GTP® TEAM (GTP GlobalTransferPricing Business Solutions GmbH), has searched for answers to the puzzle on the evolution of APAs since the late 1990s and the consecutive decades.

2. APAs as blueprint of the 1990s?
The answer, given by Brem in his thesis, underlines the claim of Angel Gurría from the OECD. Cooperation is a promising solution for complex problems. One key factor for cooperation is understood to be the existence of bilateral information asymmetry in the specific setting of relationships when it comes to tax related-party business units of the multinational groups. Regarding income allocation based on transfer pricing, it is not only the tax authority which suffers from information asymmetry but also the taxpayer. In a world with a one-sided information asymmetry, the sovereign state would impose bureaucratic mechanisms to identify the right tax base and to levy the accurate tax using the appropriate tax rate. In the field of transfer pricing and related-party business across international tax jurisdictions, however, the taxpayer also faces asymmetry in the meaning of uncertainty. As known, companies seek to turn uncertainty into risk with its probability to compute for the damage, while uncertainty is not computable. Such damages behind tax risk in international corporate taxation can be measured with variables such as burdensome tax audits, double taxation, late-delay penalty interest, and non-deductibility of expense accounted for.

Hence, the impact of APAs and other models of cooperation is straightforward: to turn uncertainty into risk with limited probability of damages. APAs exactly do this due to the nature of bilateral information asymmetry in transfer pricing fact pattern. New models of international tax cooperation also appear promising candidates for the reduction of information asymmetry.

For example, the International Compliance Assurance Program (ICAP), as presented by Thomas Eisgruber, Bavarian Tax Agency (Bayerisches Landesamt für Steuern, https://www.finanzamt.bayern.de/LfSt/default.php) in the Hamburg Forum on International Business Taxation (February 4-5, 2021) is such cooperation model. Though still in the mode of a pilot study, it provides new insights in how cooperation may help to mitigate the barriers of information access in traditional tax procedures. The European Commission is planning its EU-ICAP within the framework of the EU Cooperative Compliance Initiative. The benefits of the cooperation model were confirmed by the example presented on the multi-jurisdictional audit of the Dr. Oetker Group.

3. Digitalized Business Models as Drivers for the Renaissance of Cooperation?
The ongoing process of shifting the principles of international taxation in today’s world of global business are the Pillar I and Pillar II positions brought forward by the OECD. While Pillar I is about new taxing rights on so-called “residual profits in market jurisdictions” where the multinational group’s profit can be assigned to, while Pillar II refers to the minimum tax level imposed to the multinational group as a whole. This is nothing more than a shift in international taxation from the concept of the separate entity approach to the model of the unified approach.

In order to allocate tax rights and the tax base, jurisdictions will have to cooperate and, by assumption, the taxpaying units of the multinational group also need to enter such cooperation process between sovereign states. The driving force, as for the evolution and the co-existence of APAs in international tax mechanisms, can be considered the bilateral (or multilateral) information asymmetry in digitalized business models of today’s multinational groups. Of course, the GAFA multinationals are not the only cases of digitalized businesses. Almost each industry and each specific business organization is in the process of digitalization.

More generally, cooperation appears the efficient governance structure of the relationship between transaction partners of taxation (i.e. the state and the taxpayer) if governance structure of bureaucracy, hierarchy, or market cause higher “transaction costs”, i.e. costs of organizing, monitoring, assessing, and reporting this transaction. Again, it’s about many billions of tax dollars, and Angel Gurría gives reference to the OECD statistics on the scale of “USD 100-240 billion in revenue was being lost annually to Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) practices by multinationals”. If the costs of identifying the fair on such tax dollar, its monitoring, its enforcement in the court process, and the like is prohibitively costly in bureaucratic governance forms, then the transaction partners search for more efficient modes which cooperation could be.

In today’s world of rapidly changing business models, accelerated by digitalization, the Corona pandemic, and the effects of the climate change, such multilateral information asymmetry should be assumed to be with us for quite a while. The GTP® TEAM guesses a decade or so until the disruptive processes shaking globalization will turn into something we could call “recovery position” in which reconciliation may have overcome the disruptions.

Footnotes:
[1] https://www.oecd-forum.org/posts/a-turning-point-for-tax-international-co-operation-for-better-regulation-of-globalisation?utm_source=Adestra&utm_medium=email&utm_content=Blog%20post&utm_campaign=Tax%20News%20Alert%2004-02-2021&utm_term=ctp
[1] Brem, Markus (2005), Advance Pricing Agreements – Shifts in International Taxation. Master Thesis, FernUniversität Hagen, ISBN 3-00-018220-9. Eigenverlag.

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